8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization

Game Theory (ECON 159)

We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game.

00:00 - Chapter 1. Candidate - Voter Model
14:22 - Chapter 2. Location and Segregation: Why Outcomes Are Not Necessarily Preferences
46:01 - Chapter 3. Location and Segregation: Examples
52:10 - Chapter 4. Location and Segregation: Policy Implications
57:51 - Chapter 5. Location and Segregation: Central vs. Individual Randomization
01:00:51 - Chapter 6. Pure vs. Mixed Strategies: Rock, Paper, Scissors

Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu


This course was recorded in Fall 2007.