6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot

Game Theory (ECON 159)

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

00:00 - Chapter 1. Coordination Games: Scope for Leadership and Strategic Complements
04:59 - Chapter 2. Coordination Games: The Battle of the Sexes
18:37 - Chapter 3. Cournot Duopoly: Math
53:28 - Chapter 4. Cournot Duopoly: Real World Examples

Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu


This course was recorded in Fall 2007.