7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line

Game Theory (ECON 159)

We first consider the alternative "Bertrand" model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than setting quantities. Then we consider a richer model in which firms still set prices but in which the goods they produce are not identical. We model the firms as stores that are on either end of a long road or line. Customers live along this line. Then we return to models of strategic politics in which it is voters that are spread along a line. This time, however, we do not allow candidates to choose positions: they can only choose whether or not to enter the election. We play this "candidate-voter game" in the class, and we start to analyze both as a lesson about the notion of equilibrium and a lesson about politics.

00:00 - Chapter 1. Bertrand Duopoly: Standard Model
28:18 - Chapter 2. Bertrand Duopoly: Product Differentiation
40:13 - Chapter 3. Perfect Competition Revisited: The Candidate Voter Model

Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu


This course was recorded in Fall 2007.