17. The badness of death, Part II: The deprivation account

Death (PHIL 176)

This lecture continues to explore the issue of why death may be bad. According to the deprivation account, what is bad about death is the fact that because one ceases to exist, one becomes deprived of the good things in life. Being dead is not intrinsically bad; it is comparatively bad and one is worse off only by virtue of not being able to enjoy the things one enjoyed while alive, such as watching the sunset, listening to music, and discussing philosophy.

00:00 - Chapter 1. Introduction: The Central Badness of Death
04:35 - Chapter 2. The Deprivation Account of Badness in Death
13:22 - Chapter 3. Epicurus: "When Does Death Become Bad?"
21:21 - Chapter 4. The Existence Requirement: Is It Necessary?
32:48 - Chapter 5. Should Death Be Bad for the Loss of the Unborn Person?
49:41 - Chapter 6. Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu


This course was recorded in Spring 2007.